Value as Objective and Relational
Ayn Rand rejects both alternatives presented by the false dichotomy in meta-ethics, namely intrinsicism and subjectivism.
The former holds that values are absolute, fixed, abstract entities disconnected from any specific valuer. On this account, values exist apart from the subject doing the valuing. Platonic Forms, utilitarian calculations, and Kantian duties are three distinct examples or variants of the intrinsic approach to ethics.
The latter holds that values have no metaphysical status at all and merely arise from, and reflect, the subjective or relativistic opinions, emotions, and other non-rational considerations of individual valuers. Pragmatists and moral relativists exemplify this approach to ethics. When evaluating a system of ethics, they do not ask, “Is this true?” but rather, “Do groups of people generally believe this to be true?” On this view, values are relative to the opinions of others, regardless of the reasons those opinions are held.
In my academic philosophy studies, I have noticed that the prevalence of such subjectivist considerations has contributed to the popularisation of the term “moral intuition.” Here, the resolution of an ethical dilemma is regarded as plausible if it conforms to the “moral intuitions” of “reasonable people,” while the sources of these intuitions and their truth status remain unexamined.
According to this traditional dichotomy, values either exist apart from valuers (intrinsicism) or do not exist in any philosophical sense, representing only psychological dispositions (subjectivism). Rand defends an objective account of values. On this view, certain things are objectively values to a living organism. A value is something a living organism “acts to gain and/or keep.” The standard of value is the individual’s own life. For human beings, the purpose of that life is happiness.
Within the context of the life of an organism, values are therefore absolute, although the identity of many of these values may change over time. This explains the claim that values are relational. Every value exists only within the context of an evaluation, which in practice involves asking the questions “To whom?” and “For what purpose?”
The difference between the objective view of values and the intrinsic one should now be clear. A further question remains: how does this formulation differ from the subjective view of values, which also appears to treat values as relational?
The difference arises from the fact that human life, both in its physical and spiritual dimensions, has objective requirements. The human body and mind are the metaphysically given in the realm of ethics. Both can improve or deteriorate, yet the requirements of their survival and flourishing remain objective.
Some things are therefore objectively good or bad for each individual. This fact does not depend on personal choice. Individuals can choose whether to identify and pursue values or instead ignore them. What they cannot do is alter the facts of reality. For example, one cannot choose to stop requiring water, food, or art. The specific foods or forms of art a person requires may vary from those of another person, perhaps because of different psychological premises, but the underlying needs remain objective.
In matters of detail, morality prescribes only general requirements, such as the need to support oneself through productive effort. The particular form this effort takes remains within the discretion of the moral individual. Philosophy can identify the kinds of activities that qualify as productive and those that do not. For example, roles such as dictator or fortune-teller cannot count as moral careers because they depend upon evading or attacking reality. Philosophy cannot determine whether a person should become a painter or an electrician, since both are productive forms of work.
Values therefore exist in an objective relationship to the valuer. Because the requirements of the valuer are objective, the values themselves are objective as well. This explains Rand’s claim that values are relational without being morally relativistic.